by
G. Duncan Waugh
Fisheries Research Centre
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Wellington, New Zealand
BACKGROUND
New Zealand's chain of islands extends from latitude 29- to 53- South. The nearest continental land mass, Australia, is about 1200 km to the west. The main islands have a narrow continental shelf, average width 19 km, extending down to a depth of about 200 m. The limited area of shelf, which nevertheless extends from subtropical to subantarctic waters, and the small population (less than 3 million) were the two main factors which determined the pattern and scale of fishing until the mid 1960s. Local demand for fish in a primarily agricultural society was small - less than 7 percent of the per capita intake of animal protein. Even in the 1930s there was concern that the resources could be overfished and as a result a limited entry system was introduced in the 1940s and remained in force until 1962.
In 1959 foreign vessels began fishing to within three miles of the coast. This suggested that the resources were larger and more readily saleable on the international market than had previously been recognized. Even so these vessels, like their local counterparts, concentrated on a few high-value species such as snapper (Chrysophrys auratus). In 1961 a Government Select Committee recommended delicensing of the fishing industry and a system of commercial fishing permits was introduced. Thus anyone, on payment of a nominal fee, had the right to catch and sell his catch commercially. His recreational counterpart, on the other hand, was prevented from selling his catch and there was a limit on the number of fish or shellfish he could have in his possession on any day. Inevitably there were conflicts of interest between the local and foreign vessels and crews with respect to fishing areas. Finally it was agreed that foreign fishing should be phased out to beyond 12 miles from the coast by 1974. In this same period the local industry began to develop, first slowly and then much more rapidly as major markets for finfish began to be developed. By 1949, even before the finfish markets developed, rock lobsters - primarily Jasus edwarsii - were being exported to the USA in quantity, and they continue to be the single most valuable species. Amongst the finfish, snapper was the most valuable until 1982 when its position was usurped by orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus).
From 1963 to 1967 fisheries exports increased gradually, but from 1968 they increased rapidly while local markets remained virtually static (Table 1). Thus the industry underwent a change from one oriented primarily to local supply and demand with limited exports to one with the principal objective of earning overseas exchange. As these developments were taking place in the local industry foreign vessels were exploring further afield and fishing deeper on some of the undersea plateaus (see Fig. 1). This, coupled with the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations, led New Zealand to declare its own 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1978 (see Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977). Under the terms of the draft convention and because of the presence of small offshore islands the zone encompasses some 1.18 million square nautical miles of ocean (Blezard, 1980). Apart from two minor jurisdictional boundaries between Australia and New Zealand, New Zealand is in the privileged position of having a virtually complete 200-mile zone for its exclusive management and administration.
However, there was and continues to be considerable uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of the resources. It was almost inevitable that the Government, impressed by the sheer size of the zone, should assume that almost unlimited quantitites of fish would be automatically available, and words of caution (Waugh, 1977) tended to go unheeded.
It was quite apparent that the coastal craft were incapable of exploiting the deeper offshore waters and few local fishermen had experience in the operations of deep-sea trawlers. At the same time there was vitually no information on the species and their abundance in the zone. Nevertheless the Government, having declared the EEZ, had, under the LOS, accepted the concomitant obligation to manage the zone and its resources.
It is the evaluation of the management strategies and measures and their impact on the local industry that is the main purpose of this paper.
Table 1 Value of New Zealand fishing exports (× $1 million) from 1963 to 1981
Year | Finfish | Rock Lobsters | Total All Products |
1963 | 0.88 | 2.05 | 2.92 |
1964 | 1.10 | 3.04 | 4.15 |
1965 | 1.10 | 3.95 | 5.10 |
1966 | 1.22 | 4.62 | 5.88 |
1967 | 1.35 | 6.36 | 7.76 |
1968 | 1.69 | 12.73 | 14.63 |
1969 | 1.90 | 14.23 | 16.54 |
1970 | 4.40 | 12.43 | 17.33 |
1971 | 5.00 | 13.50 | 20.30 |
1972 | 6.79 | 11.62 | 20.40 |
1973 | 7.30 | 11.30 | 20.10 |
1974 | 7.31 | 11.42 | 20.33 |
1975 | 8.80 | 12.07 | 25.75 |
1976 | 14.75 | 19.05 | 37.88 |
1977 | 21.45 | 23.67 | 50.36 |
1978 | 32.13 | 25.40 | 63.63 |
1979 | 53.35 | 26.94 | 97.65 |
1980 | 85.87 | 29.48 | 162.44 |
1981 | 117.22 | 35.69 | 190.22 |
Fig 1: New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone, showing the management areas A to H and the areas closed to foreign fishing.
Figure 1
PLANNING AND REGULATION
The fisheries are administered under the Fisheries Act of 1908. Since then there have been a large number of amendments and regulations which have been intended to conserve resources, protect ethnic fishing rights, limit gear and so ensure a more equitable distribution of the resources amongst fishermen, etc. Most of these measures have been subject to the Parliamentary process and as such have been inordinately delayed. A new Bill, which has been widely discussed with industry and other user groups, has been drafted and could be passed into law during 1983. Basically, this Bill is designed to rationalise the provisions of the previous Act, to consolidate them, and to make it possible for managers to react much more swiftly to changing circumstances in the fishery.
After the abandonment of limited entry in 1962 the local industry began to expand, grants and loans were available for new vessels and new gear, and new markets were being developed. Export earnings began to increase (Table 1) so that by 1978 the overseas earnings were 22 times what they had been in 1963. However, even by 1978 there was some concern amongst the finfish and rock lobster fishermen that resources were being over-fished. In 1979 empowering legislation was introduced to permit the control of eel, dredge oyster, paua (= abalone), snapper, and rock lobster fishing. In the next few years a controlled fishery was established for eels in Lake Ellesmere, a system of daily boat quotas and an overall catch quota for the Foveaux Strait oyster fishery, an export quota for paua, quota and gear controls on the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery, and a controlled fishery for rock lobsters based on a number of regions around the coast (Saila et al., 1979; Annala - in press).
These various controls, coupled with the collapse of the trevally fishery in the Bay of Plenty (Waugh, 1977a; James, 1980) and the decline in catches and mean size of prime species elsewhere, finally forced Government and fishermen to look to some further limitation on fishing effort. Since 1981 there has been a moratorium on the issue of any further fishing permits, the methods which may be used are more rigolously prescribed, and the fishermen are required to provide more detailed catch and effort data.
Unfortunately, in New Zealand, as in practically every country with a developed or developing fishery, vessel numbers and processing facilities were allowed to develop and multiply to a point where they could no longer be sustained by the available resources. There was a shift from prime species to exploitation of those of lesser value. This led to successive over-fishing of a number of species and could continue to do so unless total effort is reduced or there is a definite break in the species/fishery sequence.
Inevitably there will have to be some restructuring of the industry and new management concepts applied. However, because of what happened to the inshore fisheries there was an earlier and much readier acceptance that the resources of the wide EEZ could be equally liable to over-fishing and over-capitalisation. It was also recognised that more responsive management measures would be needed to obtain maximum benefit.
Thus there have been two types of fishery - inshore and offshore - developing slightly out of phase with each other, both aimed at increasing overseas earnings, at maximising New Zealand's share of the available resources, and at maximising local employment.
The principal differences that have emerged to date are that in the coastal fisheries there is very little room to manoeuvre - there are too many vessels trying to catch too few fish - but in the offshore fisheries there is room to rationalise fishing now, before it too gets out of hand.
EEZ planning and objectives
Prior to the declaration of the EEZ a small task force, comprising a senior fisheries scientist, a fishery manager, and an administrator, was established within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to develop objectives and strategies for the deep-water fisheries. Recommendations followed by others that embrace the general philosophy of utilising the resources were embodied in a Policy Paper which has since been modified and published as a definitive document (Anon., 1981) which defines the way of apportioning the known resources between vessels and between companies during the next few years. However, the lead up to this situation has not been straightforward.
There was little or no information on the size or species composition of the resources of the zone. The LOS requires that the Coastal state determines Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and determines what proportion it can harvest with its indigenous fishermen and vessels and then allocates the balance to those countries which have “traditionally” fished in the area. Few foreign trawlers had fished in the region beyond the immediate continental shelf before the early 1970s and so the question of traditional rights hardly arose. Tunas and billfishes had been exploited for much longer, but as highly migratory species they were treated separately.
RESOURCE ASSESSMENT AND ALLOCATION
Trawl fisheries
Because New Zealand lacked a suitably large and seaworthy deep-water craft, scientists attempting to assess resources were dependent upon data from other research cruises, primarily Japanese but also some Russian. Francis and Fisher (1979) made the first estimates of the overall magnitude of the resources. At the same time it was recognised that there were areas or regions in which particular associations of species occurred. Some of these last are associated with water masses north and south of the Subtropical Convergence and with the principal warm and cold currents which flow around the islands.
The net result was the establishment of eight management zones (A to H, Fig. 1) outside the 12-mile territorial sea. In the meantime, and before the zone was formally gazetted, intense fishing in critical areas, for ling off the south-west of the South Island and for silver warehou east of Stewart Island, meant that these two areas were closed to all fishing. Within 2 years most of the shelf was included in the ‘New Zealand only’ fishing zone (Fig. 1) as the local industry demonstrated its capacity to fully exploit the prime species.
New Zealand, though lacking the deep-water vessels and crews to fully exploit the resources, nevertheless wished to benefit as much as possible from the potential harvest. To achieve this there was encouragement by way of loans, waiving of customs duty, etc., to enable local industry to acquire larger vessels. However, none of these craft were sufficiently big to work on the offshore rises and plateaus. The alternative was to establish joint venture or cooperative venture arrangements with foreign partners. New Zealand generally requires that foreign equity will not exceed 24.9 percent, although in some instances 49.9 percent has been acceptable. In most cases the foreign partner has provided the vessel and most of the crew as well as some additional opportunity for access to new markets. Various structures were set up involving varying degrees of risk for the participants, but the net result was that the quantities of fish available to foreign licensed vessels was substantially reduced.
Francis and Fisher's (1979) estimate of the resources also indicated the bounds within which there could be a reasonable annual harvest. With so few data available it was considered reasonable to err on the conservative side in setting catch quotas. Allocation was made first to local vessels on the basis of their expected catch as assessed by the Fishing Industry Board and second to joint venture vessels on the basis of the fishing plans they were required to lodge. After both these allocations had been deducted from the TACs the balance was made available to foreign licensed vessels from Japan, the USSR and Korea. Apportionment between these countries was made at Government level and took into account previous fishing history, levels of cooperation, trade access, etc.
Joint ventures were seen as a way of accelerating New Zealand's participation in the capture and processing of as much as possible of the resource. However, they also meant that much larger quantities of fish were landed into processing plants and this was seen as a threat by local fishermen who foresaw a reduction in the prices paid to them. Both the fishermen and the processors were also concerned that species taken and processed by licensed vessels were being sold at reduced prices on some of New Zealands's traditional overseas markets.
One of the original aims was the progressive New Zealandisation of the industry so that ultimately all fish would be taken by locally owned and crewed vessels. In practice, although the joint venture vessels have a proportion of local fishermen aboard for training in appropriate fishing technology, the language and ethnic barriers preclude the gradual replacement of foreign crews by New Zealanders, particularly where the foreign partners continue to own the vessels. To resolve this problem nine companies with a percent greater than 75 percent New Zealand shareholding have been allocated varying quantities of the principal deep-sea species, up to the total estimated quota, as from 1 April 1983 (see Table 2). From that date the effective ownership of the fish will pass into New Zealand hands, although the companies may continue to use their joint venture partnership vessels on a charter basis. It is also worth noting that one local company has now made its own investment in two deep-water trawlers.
There continue to be very few quantitative data on the seasonal distribution and abundance of the different offshore species. When TACs were first assessed there was no consideration of the unit value of the various species. Thus southern blue whiting (Micromesistius australis), which is particularly abundant in area E, is of relatively low value and as such is unlikely to be of economic interest to a locally-based industry. Thus it has been necessary to consider the unit value as well as likely yields in apportioning quotas which can maintain the economics of the various operations.
Hake (Merluccius australis) only spawns off the west coast of the South Island and is then vulnerable to intensive fishing. The total stock appears to be small (Patchell, 1981). To prevent overfishing a quota system was introduced and when the quota was reached all trawling ceased until the remaining fish had dispersed. However, hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae) occurs in the same area at the same time and is much more plentiful (Patchell - in press). This has meant that in order to protect the hake stock, the hoki resource has been underfished. Furthermore, the need for close monitoring created surveillance problems compounded by the conflict between locally owned and crewed vessels, which claimed to be able to harvest the total resource, and the joint venture charter vessels. Unless it becomes practical to target fish for the two species separately, which seems unlikely, the hoki stock will either continue to be underfished or the hake stock may have to be allowed to decline. This illustrates the manager's problem of conservation on the one hand and maximisation of earnings on the other. It also emphasises the need for more comprehensive quantitative and biological data on the species concerned.
In the past four years quotas have been established and are close to being reached for all the species assessed by Francis and Fisher (1979) except for the southern blue whiting in area E. Species not considered by them are the orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) and the various species of oreo dory, all of which occur in depths of 800 to 1,500 m and were located in 1979 and 1980 along the northern side of the Chatham Rise and off the east coast of the South Island. Licensed access for Russian trawlers is now restricted to area E. Japanese and Korean vessels have most of their allocations in the same area but are allowed limited access to primer species elsewhere.
The quota for orange roughy had to be established on very meagre information. The fish apparently occur in dense pre-spawning schools but little is known of their general biology or of their longevity. Thus again it was necessary to adopt what was hoped would be a conservative quota. Exploratory cruises in January and August 1981 along the edge of the Challenger Plateau from west of 172-E and between 37-S revealed significant quantities of orange roughy (van den Broek, 1981) both inside and outside the 200-mile boundary, and in the 1982 season substantial catches were made. Although this has been a further encouragement for investment in the deep-water fishery the basic problem of the size and resilience of the stock or stocks remains. Without their own research vessel capability, scientists have had to rely on opportunistic collection of data aboard commercial craft or occasional joint research cruises with Japanese institutes. However, in 1982 an additional quota of 1,000 t of orange roughy was offered by tender to a commercial company that was prepared to make one of its vessels available for a 42-day research cruise entailing stratified random sampling along the Chatham Rise (Robertson, 1982). The results obtained provide the first estimate of the standing stock along the Rise and it is hoped to undertake a similar survey on the Challenger Plateau in 1983.
From the foregoing it will be apparent that the management of the trawl fisheries of the wider EEZ has been based upon quotas and that these have had to be adjusted as more data have been acquired on the species themselves as well as on the economics of catching them.
Table 2 Allocations (tonnes) of prime species to take effect from 1 April 1983 (from Catch 1982, (9) 11
Species | Amaltal | Fletcher/Jaybel | Sanford/Feron |
Hoki | 3,336 | 8,947 | 8,231 |
Orange roughy | 2,701 | 8,123 | 6,701 |
Oreo dories | 1,701 | 5,117 | 4,221 |
Squid | 1,652 | 4,429 | 4,074 |
Ling | 661 | 1,772 | 1,630 |
Silver warehou | 496 | 1,328 | 1,223 |
Hake | 198 | 532 | 489 |
Total: | 10,744 | 30,248 | 26,569 |
Species | Sealord | South Island Deep Sea Fishing Company | Skeggs | Southland Fish Processors Co-op | Wanganui |
Hoki | 8,136 | 1,405 | 3,486 | 722 | 1,729 |
Orange roughy | 6,832 | 965 | 3,058 | 495 | 1,398 |
Oreo dories | 4,304 | 608 | 1,927 | 312 | 881 |
Squid | 4,028 | 696 | 1,726 | 358 | 856 |
Ling | 1,611 | 278 | 690 | 143 | 342 |
Silver warehou | 1,208 | 209 | 518 | 107 | 257 |
Hake | 483 | 83 | 207 | 43 | 103 |
Total: | 26,602 | 4,243 | 11,612 | 2,179 | 5,567 |
Species | Watties | Other | Total |
Hoki | 1,769 | 2,638 | 40,000 |
Orange roughy | 869 | 1,559 | 32,700 |
Oreo dories | 548 | 982 | 20,600 |
Squid | 876 | 1,306 | 20,000 |
Ling | 350 | 522 | 8,000 |
Silver warehou | 263 | 392 | 6,000 |
Hake | 105 | 157 | 2,400 |
Total: | 4,780 | 7,556 | 130,100 |
Squid
Prior to the declaration of the EEZ, New Zealand fishermen took squid mainly as a by-catch. Japanese squid jig vessels had operated around New Zealand from 1972, and after 1978, as the technique was directed solely at squid, it was decided to restrict the number of licensed vessels to that which had previously fished the area. The intention was to prevent any further increase in effort. Licence fees are payable in advance and are based on an expected catch. The licence fee is based on the average catch over the preceding five years with a royalty on the catch over and above the base allocation. This management system seeks to prevent over-fishing in years of poor recruitment but to allow the vessels to benefit if recruitment is good. In practice it assumes that the few years of data that have been collected represent the norm and that there has not been, or is unlikely to be, any recruitment over-fishing.
New Zealand's entry to squid fishing has been via joint venture agreements and as the joint venture fleet has increased so licensed access has been abated. Jigging seems unlikely to be a significant local fishery in the short-term, but in the meantime the joint venture catches improve market access and provide product for onshore processing.
Trawled squid are the subject of area quotas for licensed joint venture and local vessels and until recently were based upon a single stock concept. However, the identification of at least two species of Nototodarus (Smith et al., 1981) suggests that future management will need to ensure that effort is appropriately distributed between them in relation to their abundance. It also illustrates the lack of basic data and the need for management to be flexible and able to respond to new research findings.
Tunas
Different management measures have been adopted for the highly migratory skipjack, albacore, and southern bluefin tunas. Skipjack occur off the North Island in large schools during summer (Fisheries Research Division, 1976; Habib et al., 1980, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) and the potential harvest is estimated at 24,000 t. In the mid 1970s the local purse seine fleet was incapable of taking such quantities and authority was given for local companies to enter into charter agreements for American super seiners. However, these vessels have been denied access within the 12-mile zone and in some other areas. As the fish often school close to the boundary and frequently inside it, combined catches by the local and charter fleet have seldom exceeded 10,000 t. Local political pressure has precluded the full harvest of the resource, yet there are insufficient other pelagic species to sustain a large local purse seine fleet for the balance of the year. Alternative fishing techniques such as pole and live bait fishing could increase the local component of the catch, provide alternative employment, and reduce effort on the traditional fisheries. This type of fishery could have even greater economic appeal if, as seems possible, the fish are of sufficiently high quality for sashimi.
The troll fishery for albacore has existed since the early 1970s (Roberts et al., 1972; Roberts, 1974, 1975, 1977) but has not yet become of major significance. Joint research studies undertaken by Japanese and New Zealand scientists suggest that this fishery could be further developed by vessels capable of fishing further offshore and trolling deeper. The potential harvest is estimated at 5,000–10,000 t and there are no major management constraints. The moratorium on fishing permits does not apply and may encourage diversification away from coastal trawl fisheries.
Southern bluefin tuna have been longlined south and east of New Zealand by the Japanese since the 1950s and in 1978 the size of the licensed fleet was limited to what it had been previously (i.e. 96 vessels) in order to prevent further increase in effort. Since 1979 a small but lucrative local handline fishery for adult bluefin has developed on the west coast of the South Island. The winter fishing season coincides with the trawl fishery for hake and hoki. The fish, if properly handled, can be marketed at sashimi grade and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Fishing Industry Board, and the Federation of Commercial Fishermen combined to train fishermen in appropriate techniques. Now only trained fishermen take the fish, which in 1981 and 1982 were landed into a refrigerated reefer vessel. It was also agreed that the annual catch should be limited to 5,000 fish. This limits the number of fishermen likely to enter the fishery and avoids any glut on the market. It is not considered a conservation measure in that the tonnage - about 300 t - is minor in relation to 40,000 t taken by Japan and Australia.
The total stock is already overfished (Murphy and Majkowski 1981) and it will be necessary for the three countries to develop management measures to limit the total catch. In the meantime New Zealand fishermen, having developed a fishery in a previously unexploited area, are anxious to increase their sphere of operations and share of the catch. Inevitably this will have to be at the expense of the Japanese longline fleet. Again the principal aims are maximisation of the harvest and of overseas earnings whilst avoiding over exploitation.
Data acquisition
Until recently only lip service had been paid to the creation of a sound statistical data base for fisheries. Prior to 1974 fishermen were only required to render monthly returns of days fished and quantities of species landed. An attempt to upgrade the system met with strong opposition and as a result few reliable data have been obtained since then. The recent creation of a Fisheries Statistics Unit attached to the Fisheries Research Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries now makes it practical to develop a data base for both management and research. The Division has always been responsible for data from the offshore trawl fisheries and the tuna and oyster fisheries. With the advent of the controlled fisheries for rock lobsters these data too have been entered, as fishermen are required, as a condition of the licence, to render returns. The same now applies to the renewal of permits under the present moratorium on coastal fisheries. Thus, in the future, trends in stocks and in c.p.u.e. should be more readily perceived, but data for the critical period when New Zealand's coastal fisheries underwent such rapid change will never be available.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
Species quota and area restrictions have been favoured as the simplest to administer. In the deep-water trawl fisheries these have been further refined by allocating quotas by species to nine companies, local and joint venture, according to a set of criteria based on known performance, available vessels, and onshore processing capabilities (Anon., 1982). Quotas of particular species can be traded between companies so that they can fish for the best mix of species to meet their processing requirements.
Regulatory measures for the tuna, squid, and rock lobster fisheries have already been mentioned, but others have been introduced for other species. For example, in the Foveaux Strait oyster fishery the fleet which was already limited to 23 oyster dredgers now has an overall seasonal quota plus a daily boat quota. In this fishery the objective is conservation of the local fishery; exports are prohibited. In the abalone fishery, which is widely scattered, there is a minimum size limit and scuba gear may not be used. The overall harvest is set by an export quota which cannot be exceeded. This is probably satisfactory in that local demand is reasonably stable. The adverse effect of this type of control is that stocks can be heavily depleted in local areas, but if, as seems possible, the stocks can be supplemented by aquaculture, there will need to be some modification to the fish farming regulations.
For scallop fisheries, seasonal and area closures plus quotas have been imposed primarily to stabilise the fisheries. Seasonal and area closures have also been introduced for some of the finfish fisheries and have been supplemented by mesh regulations and area/method limitations.
Inevitably, there are conflicts of interest between the various commercial fishermen using different methods to secure the same species and between them and recreational fishermen who are quick to blame the commercial operator for any decline in their sport.
To overcome some of these problems, the country has been divided into six major regions and within these Regional Fisheries Management Plans (RFMPs) are being developed first at the local level through port liaison committees. These committees, usually but not always chaired by a Ministry Officer, include management, research, and enforcement representatives from the Ministry and also commercial fishermen, processors, and local authority and recreational interests. The principal objective has been to provide a forum in which each group can participate and gain an understanding of the others' point of view.
Initially this procedure seems to be working well in that there is a surprising commonality of views between the various groups at the local level. Whether this can be carried through to the regional level, particularly where widely ranging fishermen fish within the sphere of interest of several local liaison groups, remains to be seen. One immediate problem will be that any future management measures will require sound data for decision-making and, as already noted, historical and research data are lacking for many of the coastal fisheries.
Furthermore, there remains the perennial problem of the large versus small vessel. As the recreational fisherman blames the commercial operator for decline in abundance of sports fish so the inshore fishermen blames the offshore operator for any decline in his catches. As yet there is no management policy which defines inshore/offshore limits for the medium sized craft, but in terms of the recently released deep-water plan (Anon., 1982) vessels over 45 m are excluded from fishing the 12-mile territorial sea, all of area B, and other areas now closed to foreign trawling.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATION
New Zealand has a very long coastline for its size and population; therefore coverage by any enforcement agency is necessarily limited. On the other hand, with such a high proportion of the product going for export through a limited number of outlets there can be some overall surveillance of the production from the various species if not from the fisheries themselves. However, in an attempt to protect species, protect nursery areas, apply mesh and minimum size limits, define and police areas in which particular methods may be applied, conserve fish, and protect commercial and recreational interests, a plethora of regulations has evolved which the enforcement agency has been unable to police. The new Fisheries Act and the development of RFMPs will, it is hoped, lead to rationalization of regulations on the one hand and a greater willingness to cooperate on the other. Furthermore, with the current moratorium on the issue of further fishing permits and the requirement that renewals will be dependent upon provision of adequate statistics for the preceding year, it is expected that fishermen will appreciate the need to cooperate.
Even so, in the traditional coastal fisheries, it is now apparent that there is too much effort being applied to the resources and measures to reduce effort either by a buy-back scheme or redeployment to less traditional fisheries seem to be inevitable.
In the offshore fisheries the principal administrative considerations have been simplicity and effectiveness. All licensed vessels are required to make a port call before they commence fishing so that their gear can be inspected and they can be instructed with respect to the regulations. Similarly they must make a port call when they cease fishing and before they leave the zone. Trawlers fishing the deep water are required to report their noon day position and their daily catch to the Fisheries Control Centre so that positions and accumulated catches can be monitored. In return, the Control Centre issues a warning before a quota is reached so that vessels can prepare to leave an area. With the jig vessels and liners there are similar requirements, except that weekly positions are usually sufficient unless a vessel or group of vessels moves a significant distance.
This procedure reduces the need for air and sea surveillance of the fleet but is only practical because of the exclusive nature of the zone. It has also had the effect of reducing the number of enforcement officers aboard foreign vessels to an absolute minimum. Although this may be less expensive and more convenient, it does mean that on the larger vessels there are far too few direct observations of catches and of operations which can be checked against the daily logs each vessel is required to complete. The only occasion when the presence of enforcement officers is obligatory is when catcher vessels are offloading to a reefer. In this case the transhipment must take place in a designated area in the presence of two or more officers. In such cases the off-loaded catch can be assessed in relation to the reported catch in much the same way as the stored catch is checked when a vessel makes its port call before leaving the zone.
CONCLUSIONS
Within the limitations on available staff and in economic terms the surveillance of the licensed and joint venture vessels fishing the EEZ may be regarded as satisfactory, although the paucity of observers aboard the vessels inevitably raises doubts where apparent discrepancies arise between reported catches and log book records. Similarly, reports of infringements can seldom be checked. Quota constraints as currently proposed can be operated reasonably effectively, but these in turn are primarily dependent upon good research data which defines the standing stocks and the proportions which may be harvested. At present there are inadequate facilities or personnel for regular stock assessment surveys and inevitably there is some concern that the quotas may not remain within the necessary bounds to permit sustained yields. To some extent this concern could be removed once a sufficiently long time series of c.p.u.e. data has been established. One disadvantage of the recently released deep-water plan is that it only sets quotas for seven major species, whereas others such as barracouta and jack mackerel - important to some companies - may well be subject to additional fishing pressure.
In the meantime the degree to which New Zealand fishermen participate in the exploitation of the resources will depend upon how and if joint venture and licensed vessels are phased out of the fishery and how acceptable this may be at the political level.
In the coastal fisheries the paucity of recent c.p.u.e. data makes management decision making in terms of who should or should not have access to the resources much more difficult. As mentioned earlier, there is the classic problem of too many fishermen chasing too few fish. Management regimes aimed at conserving the resources and at the same time preserving the livelihood of coastal fishermen need to be developed as soon as possible. Continuation of employment could come in part from redeployment either to fisheries for less traditional coastal resources or to deep-water craft. This in turn requires an integrated approach to the management of the total EEZ because although the coastal species may be over exploited, the total resources have yet to be fully developed.
by
David B. Thomson
Farmhouse, Baberton
Edinburgh EH 14, Scotland
Abstract
This paper deals with the attitudes and responses of fishermen and fishing communities to fishery regulation measures. Any means used by Government to control, limit or direct fish-capture activities must necessarily affect the fisherman. His cooperation is essential to the success of the legislation. His attitude and reaction largely determine how workable any regulation will be in practice.
Fishermen tend to be individualistic and independent beings. This fact should not blind us to the enormous amount of cooperation that goes on within the industry, particularly within each port or community. To an outsider fishermen's behaviour may appear to be perverse or eccentric at times but it is little different in essence from that of any group or society whose livelihood, way of life, or existence is under threat.
The reaction of fishermen is viewed from the background of his profession and way of life. It is examined in two main areas: observation or infringement of regulations, and general communication with Government on the subject of fisheries management.
The specific purpose of management measures is then discussed and the situation facing fishery managers summarized. Some aspects of well-developed fisheries in industrialized countries are treated separately from fisheries in developing parts of the world as their situations are quite different and may merit different management goals and measures.
Ways of improving fisheries management and avoiding pitfalls are suggested in the concluding section. The importance of fostering good relations with fishermen and of involving them in the decision-making process is emphasized.
1. FISHERMEN'S ATTITUDES AND VALUES
1.1 Fishing Communities
The vast majority of fishermen live in towns or villages where fishing is the major single industry. Those residing in larger towns or cities tend to live in an enclave or section of the town close to the harbour. Within those tightly knit communities there exists a camaraderie and a set of values different from those of non-fishing communities. The prestige figures in town are the top fishermen. The daily gossip invariably centres around the fluctuating fortunes of the fishery. Fishermen's wives identify with each other both in the weekly fluctuation of their husbands' earnings and in the way they must assume more responsibility in the home when their husbands are at sea. In both these respects their lot differs from that of most shore-workers' wives. In some countries the wives are active in the processing and marketing of the fish catch.
While the fishing industry can and does accept small numbers of total newcomers, most new entrants come from a fishing family, or at least from within the fishing community. By the time a boy steps on board a vessel as a crew member proper, he has already absorbed years of folklore and peer pressure that have conditioned his outlook. He becomes a fisherman not just for the sake of earning money, but to commence a life career - and not just a life career, but for him the only logical career in life. Thereafter his experiences and companionships within the industry will further cement him into the fishing fraternity.
For a fisherman like that to leave the industry is a traumatic step, rather like denying the faith. Most traditional fishermen will leave the sea only if obliged to do so by reasons of ill health or severe economic hardship. Their natural commitment to fishing is beyond doubt. They are not “fair weather birds”. In affluent countries the characteristic is less pronounced but most fishermen have this social and cultural attachment to their profession.
1.2 Fishermen as Hunters
Fishermen are hunters, members of the last remaining world-wide profession that involves pursuit and capture of its prey. Their whole training is geared towards maximising fish catch by every means possible. To this end, wits, stamina, intuition, experience are all applied. Risks to life and limb which would be unacceptable in any land-based job are faced regularly in the pursuit of fish. The fisherman battles with the elements, with the elusiveness of the fish, and in the face of severe competition at sea, to bring home his catch.
Any obstacle put in the way of a fisherman is instinctively seen by him as a challenge. He will use all his shrewdness and resourcefulness to get around it. This attitude must be faced by those attempting to regulate fishing by legislation. If the particular regulation has a loop-hole, the fisherman will find it.
1.3 Moral values and social acceptance
If a particular measure does not meet with the fisherman's sympathy (albeit grudging) then it stands little chance of effectiveness. Many communities of fisherman are extremely moral and demand high standards from all their members. But these standards may be based on subjective judgements, particularly in the case of fishery laws. Should the fishermen feel that a law has no moral basis or that it is not effective in achieving its objectives, then they will tolerate or sympathize with infringements by their fellows. Conversely a fisherman breaking a regulation that has widespread support will have to endure the opprobrium of his community, and that is something no fisherman can afford to ignore for long.
1.4 Remuneration systems
Most fishermen's earnings the world over are based wholly or partly on a percentage of net vessel earnings. Their income is directly related to their productivity. Even in fisheries where earnings are consistently low, the possibility of larger share-outs from a bumper catch is a constant spur to greater effort. Experience has shown that as soon as this element is withdrawn from the remuneration agreement, the fishermen begin to work to rule and are disinclined to take risks. Some basic wage security is sought in fisheries with a history of exploitation, or in newly developed fisheries, and there a basic wage plus bonus system may prevail. In better developed and more prosperous fisheries there is usually no basic wage and earnings or shares are a complete percentage of net vessel incomes. As a rule, company-owned vessels operate a wage and bonus system and fisherman-owned vessels work a share system.
This is mentioned to emphasize the need for keeping the prospect of higher earnings before fishermen, to maintain incentive and productivity. An over-regulated fishery could discourage enterprise to the point where the total rent from the industry becomes uneconomic. A prosperous and productive catching sector can create and support prosperous marketing, processing and ancillary industries. But a half-hearted fishing effort will stimulate little industry ashore.
2. CONFLICTS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
2.1 Competition and Cooperation
Fishing is a competitive business. At sea fishermen compete with each other over limited fishing grounds and limited fish stocks. Ashore they vie with each other to obtain the best price for their catches and sometimes just for the sale of their catch on a limited market. The competition is seen in the way fishermen may withhold from one another, information about their fishing grounds or about their gear and techniques.
Despite the competition there also exists a strong element of cooperation, especially between fishermen from one particular port or village. They cooperate with each other at sea in matters of safety and to a lesser extent with fishing information. Ashore they may jointly purchase and share facilities for marketing fish and servicing their vessels.
Conflicts between fishermen are more likely to occur between distant communities than within any particular community. It is not that frictions are absent within localities but rather that the degree of closeness and the existing cooperation make it easier to resolve disputes. Conflicts between distant groups of fishermen are difficult to resolve in many regions because of the lack of organized leadership. Often ad hoc committees are set up to deal with a problem and then disbanded immediately after.
Organized cooperation has taken many forms over the years and in different cultures. Looser associations are often preferred to cooperatives proper, but their functions are similar and relate to bulk purchase of supplies, aquisition and management of facilities, and marketing of fish. Some self-regulation of fishing activities may also be practised.
2.2 Self-regulation
Self-regulation of fishing activities has occurred from time to time in certain localities. Often it has broken down only after an influx of large numbers of vessels from outside the locality which were too numerous or too powerful for the locals to control. Self-regulation has taken many different forms and some are listed below.
Fishermen have agreed to observe non-fishing days and closed seasons for social as well as fishery reasons. The date for commencement of an annual fishery has often been agreed upon within a community. Some fishermen groups observe taboos or prohibitions on killing certain species. A common modern form of self-regulation is the scheduling of fish landings to avoid large gluts on the market at any one time.
2.3 Unregulated fisheries
Competition in an unregulated fishery assumes a new dimension when the total fishing capacity has increased past the point where returns per unit effort start to fall. Thereafter, any increase in effort tends to produce a ‘dog eat dog’ mentality in which only the fittest survive.
Under such conditions, survival instincts may result in two kinds of behaviour as regards capitalisation. The most common, particularly where money is available, is to invest in more powerful, better-equipped units to get the maximum technological advantage. The other reaction is to minimize expenses, particularly operational expenses, as far as possible so that despite falling catches the vessel or unit will not go into debt. Thus a fishing fleet with excessive catching capacity may tend to have a number of very efficient units and a large number of marginal vessels.
Local self-regulatory agreements break down when a fishery is under pressure and any moderation in harvesting the resource is discarded. There is a rush to grab as much of the stock as possible in a short time because of the expectation that it will be completely harvested well before the season's end. This is especially true for migratory or pelagic species which appear in abundance for a few months only.
Diversification may occur provided that underutilized species are to be found and that a market exists for them. This may relieve pressure on the main resource but is not in itself a permanent solution if total fleet catching power and effort are allowed to grow unchecked.
2.4 Equity considerations
Competition within any single fleet of vessels is liable to result in over-capitalization with individual vessels increasing in size, power and sophistication. This increase in catching capacity worries fishermen as well as governments. Fishermen who would be content with a unit of modest size are pressured to aquire larger or more powerful boats. The additional power is not really necessary to catch fish, it is needed rather to maintain catches in the face of the escalating competition.
Attempts to control this problem take the form of limits to length or tonnage within an overall limited entry or licensing programme. Unfortunately, neither length nor tonnage are directly related to fishing capacity. Vessels can be built beamier, deeper and with larger engines regardless of length or tonnage restrictions.
A much more meaningful and effective yardstick for determining fishing capacity is engine power. This can be measured as total engine power in maximum continuous brake horse power. Auxiliary power would have to be added to that from the main propulsion engine. A ceiling on engine power in each vessel of a given fleet would give every fisherman a fairer chance of earning a decent income and would prevent excessive earnings by some who were able to afford much larger and more powerful vessels. It would also make control of fishing effort that much easier.
2.5 Inshore/Offshore Conflicts
A common and rather naive belief is that small boats fish close to land and big vessels fish far offshore where better catches are to be found. Unfortunately the real situation is quite different. The inshore zone is by far the most productive in fish, area for area, and the productive offshore zone extends only to the edge of the continental shelf. Beyond that there is very little fishing activity apart from those for oceanic species like tuna.
In the absence of any regulatory discipline, fishermen will take the line of least resistance and try to obtain a catch on the closest and most productive grounds. If thereby they infringe on the livelihood of local small-boat fishermen, their attitude will be 'it is a pity but fishing is a competitive business', without the protection of enforceable law, small-scale fishermen will always be vulnerable to unfair competition from fleets of larger vessels.
The competition is unfair because the large vessel can fish much farther afield and in deeper waters. It can travel long distances and can cope with the weather offshore most of the time. The small inshore boat has distinct limitations as to distance, weather, and fishing grounds it can work.
The small-scale fisherman also represents the coastal community situated closest to the inshore fishing grounds. These communities are often small and the fishing industry however small it is may be the chief basic industry on which the village or town has been built. Destruction of the inshore fishing fleet may cause serious economic and social repercussions in such communities.
Exclusion from inshore grounds is a measure offshore fishermen may resent but can learn to live with and which would not seriously affect their productivity. For the small-boat fishermen on the other hand, unrestricted competition with larger vessels could ultimately bring about his extinction.
2.6 National/Foreign Conflicts
International fisheries conflicts have occurred for centuries but have tended to be periodic and localized. As distant water operations developed this century, they became more frequent and more prevalent. The establishment of 200 mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for the fisheries of most countries has been the most important single measure taken to cope with the problem.
But the 200-mile EEZ does not in itself remove all source of conflict. Foreign vessels are still permitted to fish within EEZ limits, under licence or under joint venture agreements. A 200-mile zone is a colossal area to police and for many countries adequate surveillance is too costly, so infringements may continue to occur.
From the national fishermen's point of view, two requirements are indispensable in any agreement to permit fishing by foreign vessels. Firstly, the limits of their licence as to vessel size and type, fish species, area to be fished, and quantity to be taken, must be acceptable to the local industry as a whole. Secondly, the method of policing and of enforcing the licence conditions must be seen to be effective.
If either of these two items are lacking to some degree then resentment and bitterness will result. This may occasionally flare up into violent incidents at sea, or may manifest itself in a refusal by national fishermen to obey local or national fishery regulations. Some governments have permitted foreign fishing within their EEZ's as a quid pro quo for other trading privileges. Sometimes the licence fee charged has been insufficient to cover even the cost of surveillance. Such agreements can generate only ill-will and hostility between national fishermen and their governments.
3. FISHERY REGULATIONS: PROLIFERATION, PURPOSE & PRIORITIES
3.1 Proliferation of regulations
Fishery administrators and scientists refer often to the enormously complex nature of fishery problems in multi-species fisheries with multi-purpose vessels. Fishermen for their part might be forgiven for expressing bewilderment at the array of management measures and proliferation of fisheries regulations.
A skipper-owner has to know and comply with marine transport regulations that govern navigation, vessel seaworthiness, safety equipment, radio communication and skipper certification. He must be aware of the rights of fishermen employees and the obligations their employers have to adhere to. The mesh sizes in the cod ends of his trawls have to conform to regulations for his area. At sea he must be aware of any limit lines or restricted areas, and of times or situations in which he may or may not use certain types of gear. On top of all this he may have to obey a quote limit on his catch of certain species of fish and/or a limit to the permissable by-catch. And these measures may change at short notice several times a year.
It was C.F. Hickling who, over 25 years ago in a memorandum on fisheries to the British Colonial Office, warned of unnecessary legislation on management. That of course was in the days when many tropical fisheries were relatively under-exploited. He advised that no management measures be taken unless there was substantial evidence that fishing activities were threatening stocks, and cautioned that if measures were taken, great care be exercised to ensure that the regulations devised really did solve the problem, were easily enforceable, and had no serious side effects.
Bad legislation or unnecessary legislation will always bring good legislation into disrepute. Unfortunately, in most developed fisheries, we are already in the situation where fishermen are bitter at politicians and legislators over what they consider to be unhelpful regulations.
Part of the blame may lie in the lack of communication or inadequate communication between fishermen and legislators. The justification for and purpose of some fishery regulations may have been poorly explained to the fishermen. Some administrators may misrepresent measures by exaggerating secondary intentions behind the laws. And law-enforcement officials may apply the letter of the law without sufficient regard to its spirit.
Perhaps the fisherman can be excused for viewing all kinds of regulation as coming from the same interfering hand of government, although he may be dealing with several different ministries and authorities, and with legislation related to matters as diverse as safety, investment, quality control, management of effort and conservation of resources.
Management Measure | Detail or Example | Purpose or Intent |
---|---|---|
Total Allowable Catch | Of any one species, for a whole fleet or country | Conservation of resource |
Vessel/Fisherman Quotas | Maximum weight of species permissable per trip | Equalization of resource share |
Fishery Limits | 12-mile coastal limit | Protection of inshore fishermen |
Closed Areas & Boxes | Closed bays & estuaries Haddock box, Pout box | Conservation of certain species |
Closed Seasons | Prohibition of fishing during certain months | Protection of spawning fish |
Moratoriums | e.g. Herring, North Sea, 1977–1982 | Emergency measure to let stocks recuperate |
Foreign Vessel Tax | On estimated catch from within EEZ | For revenue, foreign currency |
Landing Prohibition | e.g. Berried lobster, undersized cod, etc. | Protection of immature or spawning fish |
Vessel Restriction | Limited by size or power from any given area | Protection of small-boat fisherman |
Licence Fee or Fishery Rent Tax | Applied or suggested for limited entry fisheries | Prevent windfall profits and share rent with State |
Licensing | Of vessels | Facilitate control of fleet size & power |
Licensing | Of fishermen | Provide job security & bargaining power |
Licensing | Of gear (usually fixed gear) | Prevent conflicts & over-exploitation |
Gear Restriction | Minimum mesh size | Reduce fishing mortality of juveniles |
Gear Restriction | Overall gear size | Equalize effort & opportunity per unit |
Gear Restriction | Specific gear prohibition | Reduce fishing effort and/or prevent excessive fishing mortality of vulnerable stock |
Development or Support Measure | Conditions | Purpose or Intent |
---|---|---|
Grant or Loan on New Vessel | Size, type, fishery, specification. Qualifications and experience of applicant | To maintain a modern efficient fleet and direct development in approved ways. Also to encourage vessel ownership by fishermen |
Vessel Withdrawal Compensation | For licensed boats within over-capitalized fishery | To reduce overall fleet size and effort, and so prevent over-exploitation and stabilize earnings for those left in the industry |
Subsidy on Landed Fish | Species, whether gutted, size of boat & crew | To maintain supplies and support fishermen when market prices for fish are sub-economic |
Fish Withdrawal Subsidy | Species offered for sale on market | To compensate fishermen when catches fail to realize minimum prices on fish markets |
Internal Tax/ Subsidy on Species | Tax on high-priced easily-marketed species, used as subsidy on lower-priced less-exploited fish | To prevent over-exploitation of valuable species and encourage harvesting of less desirable fish, thus equalizing effort and encouraging market development |
It might be a useful exercise sometime to identify all existing regulations applicable to any one fishery and ascertain their original purpose. One might note their current effects, side effects, nuisance value and costs of enforcement and compliance. Then one might make some estimate of the degree to which they have achieved or are achieving their original objectives. All management measures would have to be included, and not just those which apply directly to resource conservation.
The table above attempts to categorize and simplify major management and development measures and their basic purpose.
3.2 Priorities for regulations
Each interested party has a different set of priorities for fisheries management depending on their profession, training and/or invested interest. So we would expect differing approaches to management from resource biologists, economists, administrators, politicians, fish merchants and fishermen. The views of the other professions will be dealt with in other papers, here we might pause to list the main priorities for fishermen.
Resource conservation
Despite all the fears of biologists and the “tragedy of the commons” situation, practically all fishermen want the resource conserved, not just for the immediate future but for future generations. Any resistance to conservation measures would be due to doubts about their effectiveness or their fairness, but not to the purport of the legislation itself.
Equality of opportunity
Few fishermen enjoy being in a vicious circle of unrestrained competition, particularly in an over-capitalized fishery. There is constant pressure then to aquire larger and more powerful vessels to gain a technological advantage over one's fellow. Competition itself is the spice of a fisherman's life and it is welcomed as long as it is competition by equals with the same rules and conditions applying to all.
Balanced harvesting of resources
Some species are more marketable than others but most fishermen would agree it is not healthy for the marine environment to have fishing effort concentrated on a few species. A management system that can encourage a spread of fishing effort without penalising any one section of the fleet would be welcomed.
Protection of inshore fishermen
The small need to be defended against encroachments by the large, the weak against the powerful. Fleets of small inshore boats need protection against uncontrolled fishing by offshore boats in their areas. Similarly offshore boats may require some protection against unrestrained fishing in their areas by distant water vessels or by foreign fleets. Compromise and adjustments will no doubt be necessary in each locality but the principle itself would be acceptable to most fishermen.
Freedom and flexibility
Management measures should be sufficient to maintain fish stocks and control fleet size and fishing power. But they should not over-regulate to the point where incentive is killed or opportunity is seriously curtailed. Sacrifices will have to be made but legislators should leave the maximum amount of freedom with the fishermen, consistent with the goals of management. Do not take away from the fishermen more liberty than is really necessary.
Stability and prospects
For most fishermen the past fifteen years have been ones of change and upheaval. Some management measures, hastily contrived to cope with events, have been a miserable failure. Fishermen would like to view their future with some confidence. They would like a management system that tends towards permanence, one that takes the long view rather than a series of temporary or short-term measures which simply take them from crisis to crisis.
These are some fishermen's priorities. There are others and their relative importance would vary from region to region. But none are really inconsistent with those of government, research or business, and a meeting of minds on appropriate and effective measures is surely not impossible.
4. REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC REGULATIONS
4.1 General reactions
With respect to any single piece of fishery legislation, there are four main factors which will influence a fisherman and determine the degree to which he will observe the law.
The first is his judgement as to the integrity and value of the legislation. Should he feel it has little moral basis or that it is ill-designed to achieve its objective, then he will feel little compunction in breaking it.
The second consideration is the behaviour of his peers. If the law applies equally to them or if they as a body tend to observe it then he will be much happier to comply with it himself. However, if some of his fellow-fishermen are exempt from the law or if a fair number of them are flouting it, then he will tend to disregard it.
Thirdly, there is the potential reward for disregarding a regulation. Would he increase his catch substantially by doing so? Generally speaking most fishermen break regulations only when they are having difficulty in obtaining an economic catch by legal means. Under such circumstances the greater the increased catch by illegal means, the greater the temptation.
The fourth factor is the strictness of the surveillance system and the punitive measures, or put simply, the risks and costs of being caught. No fishermen infringing a regulation expects to be caught, but the possibility is there and it is obviously a disincentive. This applies more to the generally law-abiding. Fishermen will admit themselves that the half-hearted poacher is much more likely to be caught than the determined and regular one.
4.2 Fishery limits
Local and national fishery limits, closed bays or inshore areas, and “boxes” at sea are the common forms of limit lines a fisherman may meet with. The purpose of establishing such limits needs to be clearly defined and should be acceptable to the industry as a whole. It may be to protect inshore or local fishermen, or to conserve fish stocks or safeguard spawning grounds. But whatever the reason, it must have a clear basis in fact and a concensus of support from the fishermen. Otherwise continuous surveillance would be necessary and even then enforcement would simply create bitterness and detract from the respect accorded to other more sensible legislation.
Generally speaking fishermen will observe limit lines unless under economic pressure to increase their catches by any means. In all fisheries where fleets are prohibited from fishing in certain areas, one may find a small proportion of habitual poachers. These fishermen thrive on the existence of a limit, and amusingly, are usually the last to seek removal of the limit line.
Where a limit line exists to protect inshore fishermen one can rely on them to some extent to provide surveillance. Conflicts do occur however, but mainly in countries where the inshore fishermen have little economic or political power and where law enforcement is lacking.
4.3 Landing prohibitions
These take many forms. In several countries there are minimum sizes for certain fish offered for sale for human consumption. Egg-bearing or “berried” lobsters must by law be returned to sea in many fisheries. Industrial fish catches may not contain more than a certain percentage of edible fish under certain agreements.
There is little real resentment towards such landing prohibitions which most fishermen accept. Some like those for under-sized fish and percentage of edible fish in catches consigned for fish meal, may have a nuisance element. A trawler striking large quantities of small fish may face a problem in selection of acceptable sizes. There may be 2,500 small haddocks in one tonne weight of the fish.
A crew selecting and gutting several tons of the fish is bound to err with sizeable numbers of immature ones. Similarly, the presence of edible fish among trash fish is difficult to estimate with precision. But these considerations apart most fishermen would not view the landing regulations unfavourably.
4.4 Gear restrictions
These laws or by-laws may refer to minimum mesh size, use of otter boards or tickler chains, use of monofilament gill nets or nets above a certain size. This is one group of regulations whose observance depends largely on the fishermen's judgement of fairness. The questions in their minds will be:
Is the regulation affording reasonable protection to a certain stock of fish or to a group of inshore fishermen?
Is the regulation being fairly and firmly enforced? If most other fishermen are ignoring it, there will always be a temptation to do likewise.
It is essential that the fishermen are involved in the discussion and formation of any gear-restriction measures, and that these measures if adopted, be enforced without partiality throughout the fishery. Exceptions or loopholes will only cause bitterness and bring the law into disrepute.
4.5 Closed seasons and moratoriums
A complete ban on fishing for any one species, whether short-term or long-term, is much easier to enforce than any catch limit or quota. Fish must be sold, processed and retailed somewhere, and inspection at key centres can usually detect and prevent any violations.
From the fisherman's point of view, a complete ban is preferable in some ways to a quota. With a quota system it is easier to escape detection of infringements or to avoid compliance through legal or technical loopholes. Some fishermen will find ways of doing both. The attraction of a complete ban as compared to a TAC system is that it is usually applicable to all and the opportunities for violation are greatly reduced. There is a grain of comfort in the thought, however difficult a situation may be, that all others are in the same boat and are suffering equally as a result.
The major problem created by a closed season or a moratorium on fishing is that of alternative income. Few governments can afford to compensate all fishermen for an extended period and short-term employment ashore is seldom available. So some other marine resource has to be harvested.
For the fisherman this poses three questions. What alternative species may he fish for? How will he harvest them? And does an adequate market exist for those fish? If all three can be answered satisfactorily then the moratorium will not seriously affect his livelihood. If alternative species or market is not available then his problems are extremely serious. Technological adaptation for harvesting a different species may pose some minor difficulties but these are not normally insurmountable.
4.6 Total Allowable Catches (TACs)
For the individual fisherman or for a small fleet operating from the same home port, the vital element in a TAC measure is not the total national or regional TAC but the permitted catch allocated to each fisherman or each vessel. No matter how generously his province or country has been treated as regards share of marine resources, the individual fisherman will judge the measure by the quota assigned to him or to his vessel. If this is sub-economic or creates operational difficulties, then he will resent both the regulation and its enforcement.
One of the most disappointing aspects of quotas, particularly on groundfish in multi-species fisheries, is that they may result in the destruction of more of those fish rather than less. If a vessel has already taken its quota of, say, haddock, and is trying to make up its catch with cod, whiting and saithe or hake, it may have to kill additional haddock in large numbers in order to capture the other species. This situation, reported by fishermen in both the east and west sides of the North Atlantic, adds neither logic nor respect to TAC measures.
A second major disadvantage to quotas is that they are not easy to enforce. Fish may be passed at sea from one vessel to another. Fish may be landed at obscure ports where no fishery officer is present. Landing dockets may be forged to list quota fish under a different species name. Some fishermen will violate the regulations in these ways, and the more widespread these infringements, the less motivation there will be for a law-abiding fishermen to continue to comply with the measures.
A third problem arises with respect to pelagic stocks for which fishing may commence on a certain date. These species are more subject to market fluctuations due to the timing and volume of the landings. If, as has been increasingly the case in recent years, fishermen fear that the total catch allocations are too large, they will fish as hard as possible to take their individual quotas before the annual stock is depleted. This results in sudden market gluts ashore and consequent falls in price with good edible fish often consigned to industrial plants for reduction to meal and oil.
Daily or trip quotas have been tried to prevent gluts on the market; these work best with demersal fish. Pelagic fish are caught in quantity and a vessel may search for them for a whole week before making a set. In such circumstances a strict daily or trip quota can only create frustration and increased bitterness for the men who are trying to earn a livelihood.
When vessels from different countries fish side by side on the same grounds under a quota regulation, the system of enforcement must not just be fair but be seen to be fairly and firmly applied to all. In the EEC common pond system, enforcement is the responsibility of the country to which the vessels belong. Fishermen from some countries felt that other governments turned a blind eye to infringements by their vessels. Whether their suspicions were justified or not, they existed, and this in turn motivated them to look for ways of getting around the quota regulations.
Fishermen's attitudes to quotas may be summarized in three statements or expressions of opinion. They do not work. They are difficult to enforce. And they are often unfairly applied or allocated.
4.7 Internal species tax
This is a measure taken by fishermen to equalise opportunity amongst themselves and to prevent over-exploitation of a valuable species. A tax is levied on the valuable fish, say cod, and is used to subsidize the price of a less valuable and less exploited fish, say redfish or saithe. Without the tax, most vessels would fish primarily for the cod and ignore the other fish. With the tax/subsidy, a substantial number of vessels will turn their attentions to the less desirable fish. There is then less intense pressure on the valuable fish and the species previously ignored, begin to be harvested in quantity.
The measure then (it is hoped) has a third effect. Fish merchants, faced with increased quantities of cheaper fish, look around for new outlets for them and have them promoted in retail shops and restaurants. Consumption of the unfamiliar species rises and consequently their price rises. So the fleet of vessels concerned enjoys increased income from increased volume of landings and later further increases from higher prices for previously cheap fish.
This system has been tried in only a few isolated cases, as in Iceland, so it is too early to gauge fishermen's reactions. It is obviously an idea with some potential but which also calls for considerable cooperation and short-term sacrifices by the fishermen. Nevertheless, it could be useful in spreading fishing effort in certain cases.
4.8 Licensing and licence limits
The natural reaction of any fisherman to licensing must be negative. Traditional fishermen in particular, born into a fishing family or into a fishing community, will regard their entry into the industry (and their sons' and grandsons' entry) as a birthright which ought never to be relinquished.
Licensing then will never be a popular idea, initially with fishermen. At best it may be regarded as a necessary evil. To accept a system that will thereafter limit entry into their fishery, the fishermen must be convinced that the alternative is much worse. Retention of the status quo may result in a vicious circle of more or larger vessels and less fish all round with consequent survival of the fittest and extinction of large numbers of otherwise viable fishing units.
The most vociferous opposition to licensing usually comes from the highliners or top fishermen who are most likely to gain in a free for all situation and who would be at the forefront of technological innovation with larger, more powerful and better equipped vessels.
As with much other fishery regulation, a great deal depends on how fair the licensing system is seen to be, both in concept and in implementation. If it really will conserve stocks, stabilize incomes and make for a more prosperous fishing industry in the long run, then it stands a fair chance of acceptance. But if there is any suggestion of favouritism, special interests, paternalism or betrayal, then naturally no self-respecting fisherman will support it. The full participation of the fishermen at all stages in formulating and implementing such a fundamental change in management is absolutely essential.
One aspect of licensing that would in the long run receive the support of most fishermen would be limitations to the size or power of individual units. This prevents over-capitalization and thus undesirable increases in catching capacity or fishing effort. But it also prevents a small number of fishermen from taking the lion's share of the catch and growing excessively rich at the expense of the others.
Most licence limitations to vessel size have in the past been related to length or tonnage. Fishermen have found ways round these criteria by installing greater engine power and heavier equipment and by constructing vessels designed to gain maximum advantage from the legal or statutory definitions of length or tonnage.
A limit to total engine power would be much more realistic and this has in fact been applied to some fisheries. The criteria for determining engine power can be related to manufacturer's authenticated specifications, or to approved tests by certified marine engineers or surveyors. The latter would be essential in the case of devoted engines or marinised engines and an official seal would have to be placed on the governor. Thereafter any infringements would be treated seriously with possible loss of licence as a penalty.
Licence limitation by total engine horsepower would then have benefits in terms of equity, control of fishing effort, prevention of over-capitalization and reduction in total fuel consumption. Great care would be necessary in determining power limits for vessels operating in different areas and with different gear types, but most fishermen would support these measures in the long run.
4.9 Licence fee or fishery tax
In limited entry fisheries more than others it is possible for some fishermen to obtain high earnings in a short period of time. This phenomenon may occur in the early stages or may recur from time to time during years when yields are high and markets are buoyant. Some economists view this as a bad thing and suggest a fishery rent tax or imposition of fishing-licence fees.
Of all the management measures referred to in the foregoing pages, this must rank as the most obnoxious to the fishermen. For generations they may have struggled to extract a livelihood from the sea in the face of many hardships, fluctuating stocks, poor or limited markets and exploitation by merchants or vessel owners. Now when they are finally to reap a significant reward for their efforts, some artificial ceiling is to be placed on their earnings. It is not as though they do not already pay taxes on their incomes, personal incomes and vessel incomes, plus levies on fish landed for all sorts of purposes, plus taxes on fuel oil and some other purchases. No, on top of all that, some economic advisors suggest a further heavy licence fee or fishery tax.
A heavy licence fee would discourage primarily the average and below average fishermen. The top fishermen would always be able to afford it. It could result in unnecessary withdrawals from the industry during years when available fish stocks were low. The other social and economic costs would have to be considered. A fleet composed of many units of modest fishing power would support numerous secondary industries ashore in boatbuilding, engineering, net making, ice manufacture, electronics, marketing, transport and processing. To jeopardise the health and stability of the fleet which is creating and supporting secondary industry for the sake of an additional tax would appear to be unwise.
If a special fishery tax were to be introduced it would be much fairer from the fisherman's point of view to relate it to excessive vessel profits and make it a kind of surtax. Thus a vessel with a replacement value of say $1 million might be eligible for a fishery tax on all pre-tax profits over say 30 percent of replacement value. The fishery tax would be at a rate which would still leave something for the owners after payment of other taxes. But to a fisherman the tax would still be rather pointless. Under a well-formulated licence arrangement it should not be possible to increase the fishing power of any unit or replace it with a more powerful unit, without buying out another licence. So any increase in income might be invested in minor vessel improvements but could seldom be invested in additional fishing capacity. Presumably the income would be invested in some other way of benefit to the community or the country.
Some economists have suggested a landings tax as an alternative to a licence fee. The government would exact a duty on all fish sold by licenced fishery vessels. This would have two obvious results. The fishermen would fish harder to land more fish and make up earnings lost by the tax. This would be more pronounced during lean years and would result in increased pressure on the very fish stocks the licence was devised to protect. A second effect would be increased cost of fish to consumers since there would be considerable pressure by the fleet to push some of the tax cost on to the market price. So the housewife would end up paying part of the landings tax.
Experience in limited entry fisheries to date would appear to suggest that the benefits reaped from having a stable and prosperous fishing fleet, creating wealth and supporting ancillary industry ashore, are too valuable to risk by over-taxing the primary producers.
For most free-entry fisheries the arguments about fees and taxes are rather academic at present, and in any negotiations on limited entry are a bit of a red herring. Windfall profits are being reaped by very few fishermen in unregulated fisheries. Many who made large sums of money with big new purse seiners, lost most of it shortly after when they were hit by increased fuel prices, high interest rates, quota allocations and/or depressed markets at around the same period of time.
Fishing has always been marked by brief periods of high earnings. These must be viewed in the light of two things: (a) the prolonged periods of low or modest earnings, and (b) the enormous risks involved.
Fishermen do not enjoy the security or benefits that go with more stable jobs on land. They get no holiday pay whatsoever, no job-related pension, no guaranteed wage in case of catch failure, and no cost of living increase other than what the market affords, and it usually lags behind price increases for fuel, equipment, stores and services.
Statistics show the risks to life and limb which fishermen face are much greater than those in coal-mining, fire-fighting or any other major dangerous occupation ashore. In addition there are the financial risks in building or purchasing a vessel for which the fisherman has probably invested his life savings and mortgaged his home.
When occasional high earnings are viewed against the indirect benefits of having a viable fishing fleet which is making no demands on the exchequer for subsidies or welfare payments; and when they are weighed against the risks fishermen face and the periods of low earnings, then the idea of placing a high fee or fisheries tax on the primary producers appears to be both mean and self-defeating.
There are other much better ways of preventing windfall profits and sharing fishery wealth with the government and the community. One such method would be to eliminate gradually all large and powerful vessels from the fleet and retain only smaller powered units up to the minimum size deemed necessary for safe exploitation of the waters in the region concerned. Each unit would then be limited in capacity and fishing power and would be less likely to make excessive profits. Nevertheless, each unit would be more productive than in a free entry fishery and would be yielding tax revenues to the State and supporting numerous ancillary workers ashore. Fishermen employment would also be maximized, a matter of considerable help to any economy in these days of recession and unemployment.
This kind of management of units of effort could be implemented in distinct national fisheries where all operators are subject to licensing regulations. It would be difficult to achieve in fisheries where fleets from several states operate on the same grounds. But it might still be possible in common pond situations like the EEC, though only with the agreement of all member States.
5. POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION WITH GOVERNMENT
Poor communication is one of the major obstacles in achieving understanding between fishermen and government. Fishermen have difficulty expressing themselves to government, and governments generally have difficulty in understanding the fishermen's point of view. Conversely, government statements may be misunderstood by fishermen and its actions misinterpreted.
There are three main causes for this communication failure and they ought to be examined if a serious attempt is to be made to remedy matters.
5.1 Geographical and cultural isolation
Fishermen are isolated from others by the nature of their work and of their settlements or communities. The greater part of their time is spent at sea in almost total isolation from society. Their short periods ashore are largely spent in their own close-knit communities with their particular values, world view and way of life. The geographical and cultural isolation of fishermen makes them a more difficult group to communicate with than farmers, miners, truckers or other workers who also suffer from isolation or inaccessibility.
It takes time to set up a consultative meeting with fishermen. They need time to get ashore and to get from their towns or villages to the government office which is usually located in a city. Even if only one or two fishermen's representatives are called for, they need time to consult their fellows and to get authorization or guidance on negotiating positions and tactics. It would be better if government investigative bodies or consultative teams would spend a reasonable time in each of the main fishing centres, hearing testimony or reactions and answering questions. But that is an experience they are usually disinclined to submit to.
5.2 Inarticulateness of fishermen
Fishermen are remarkably articulate in their own environment. They have their own poets, prophets and writers. At sea they are expert in verbal communication by radio-telephone and ashore they have no problem in expressing themselves to fish buyers, boat builders and net makers. However, bureaucratic and diplomatic language and procedures are quite alien to them and they can fail to convey articulately their views and desires to government.
Inarticulateness may be evident in several ways. To begin with fishermen find the maze of government bureaucracies quite confusing and may be unaware of the correct procedures or channels to follow in expressing a complaint or request. Secondly, they tend to be oral communicators and dislike having to put pen to paper. Many fishermen cannot understand why an oral expression or application is not sufficient for government. It is normally all that is necessary within his own environment. Thirdly, fishermen are not familiar with the language of law, bureaucracy or diplomacy. They may use such terms themselves without regard to their precise legal connotation and may read into diplomatic language by government officials, more or less than it was intended to convey.
As a result of this communication problem it may be very difficult to arrive at an understanding with fishermen though on the other hand it may be easy to pass legislation before the fishermen have realised its full implications. This may explain partly why fishermen so often appear to protest after the event.
5.3 Vehicles of expression and representation
Of all groups of primary producers, the fishermen must surely be the worst organized. The lobbying power and influence of farmers' and miners' unions is renowned. What group of fishermen ever brought down a government or changed the direction of trade or industrial law? Only perhaps those fortunate enough to be in a country where fishing was the major or one of the major national industries.
In almost no country can any single organization speak with authority on behalf of fishermen. Instead we have a proliferation of organizations and elected representatives. In this respect the fishermen are perhaps their own worst enemies but one suspects that other vested interests prefer to keep the fishermen divided and disputing among themselves. In the UK, for instance, there are regional fisheries associations and associations organized by species fished. There are fish producer organizations, fishermen's cooperatives, trawlermen's unions and a fishermen's federation. Elected representatives a fisherman may approach include Regional Councillors, Westminster MPs, and Euro MPs.
In some countries, federations or associations representing large fishing companies have enormous political clout, while those representing small-scale fishermen or owner-operated vessels are both fragmented and poorly represented. This may result in excessive government support for big companies or industrial fisheries and neglect of the small-scale sector which actually produces most of the fish in the majority of countries.
5.4 Confusion of issues and interests
Fishermen's interests in management measures fall into two overlapping categories, namely vessel size and sphere of operations, and fishing gear or species harvested. Each category has three main sub-divisions as follows:
Vessel size and sphere of operations:
Inshore boats operating close to land and usually within 10 to 30 miles of their home port.
Offshore vessels operating within the 200-mile zone in national waters.
More distant-water vessels fishing in international seas, within the EEZs of neighbouring states, or in “common pond” areas of their own waters.
Fishing gear and species harvested:
Demersal fisheries or trawler fleets.
Pelagic fisheries or purse-seine fleets.
Shellfish fisheries or coastal fleets.
The particular designations may vary from country to country and there may be additional groups or sub-groups but the broad divisions remain similar. Note that each size and area category may overlap with each gear and species category. This leads to confusion of issues and interests.
Add to those interest groups the various vehicles of political expression and representation and it is small wonder that fishermen's protests and lobbying are characterized by confusion and discord. Certainly the public, if not the government, is rarely able to appreciate what the fishermen want.
The meanest trick a government can play on fishermen in such circumstances is to use testimony from one group to discount the pleas of another whose interests are totally different. A classic example of this occurred when one country signed the EEC common fisheries policy. The domestic fleet appealed for a 50-mile exclusive limit within the common pond. But the trawlers federation, none of whose vessels operated within 100 miles of the country stated that six miles was more than adequate. The government of the time jumped on this as justification for signing away access to all the inshore and nearwater fishing grounds.
5.5 Principles of communication and negotiation
The task of a Fisheries Administrator faced with a confused mixture of appeals and demands is to negotiate skillfully and impartially to ensure that no one group of fishermen suffers unduly. If sacrifices are called for to achieve conservation of fish stocks he must see to it as far as possible that the burden is equally shared by each group.
However tiresome the procedure may be, governments should ensure that the views of every legitimate fishermen's group be heard and not just those of the most powerful or most vociferous. Spokesmen for fish merchants, processors, plant owners or other shore industry should not be allowed the pretense of speaking for the fishermen. Similarly, companies and businessmen owning fishing vessels are a different breed from fishermen and have different priorities.
When a group of fishermen are in serious economic plight, their leaders - having little bargaining power - may accept a settlement that they feel is unjust or extortionate. Such an achievement in negotiations may prove to be a hollow victory in the long run for the powers that be. It would sow the seeds of discontent, bitterness and inclination to violate regulations which could jeopardize the success of any fishery management scheme.
6. FISHERIES OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
6.1 General description
The fishing fleets of the industrialized states are characterized by power, sophistication and versatility. Even small inshore boats may be equipped with radio-telephone, radar, echo-sounder and hydraulically operated steering gear, winch and net hauler. The investment cost of most fishing units lies in the range of $50,000 to $1,500,000. This is in contrast to developing country fisheries where individual fishing units may cost from $1,000 to $300,000 with the vast majority costing less than $10,000.
Numbers employed in the catching sector are modest. Catch per fishermen varies from about 20 tons to 60 tons for human consumption and from 100 tons to 300 tons for those countries with large industrial fisheries. So the production per man is from ten to a hundred times that of the least developed countries (LDCs).
As most industrialized countries are located in the temperate north where there are less species, this is reflected in the catch, both in its composition and in the smaller number of methods used in harvesting.
Despite the enormous power and sophistication of the industrialized country fleets it would be a mistake to assume that the bulk of their production is from large vessels. With the exception of a very few countries like the USSR, most developed country fleets are composed of vessels of less than 100 tons.
In the UK, for instance in 1981 there were only 239 trawlers above this size and they took only 21 percent of the demersal catch. The other 342,000 tons was taken by 1,976 smaller vessels.
6.2 Conflicts between fleets
The developed fisheries are being harvested at levels close to and sometimes rather beyond sustainable yields for some species, and by fleets of vessels equipped with powerful and sophisticated aids to fish location and capture. Both the overall level of effort and the intensity of the competition make conflicts inevitable. These arise between fleets of inshore and offshore vessels and between local and foreign vessels.
Because inshore fleets are limited in the distance they can travel, they are vulnerable to local fluctuations in inshore stocks. Even when several species are fished, the loss of one may greatly reduce annual income. It is important therefore to provide these fisheries with some kind of protection from competition by large vessels.
There is no need for large sea-going craft to fish inshore and a protective belt would not hurt the offshore fleet unduly. But it could mean salvation and preservation of viable inshore fishery with all its attendant benefits for small coastal communities.
The extent of the protective coastal belt will vary according to local requirements, but could be 6, 12 or 15 miles with some bays or firths completely enclosed. As far as possible the local communities and local fishermen's associations should be given substantial authority over the section of the belt adjacent to them.
Offshore fishermen face two kinds of competition, that from other domestic vessels and aggravated perhaps by over-capitalization, and that from foreign vessels permitted to fish in their waters by licence or under common pond agreements. Both kinds of competition need to be controlled to limit total fishing effort to a level which will not damage stocks.
Fishermen will suffer the foreign encroachments if at least they are fully subject to the conditions of their licence. Enforcement has to be thorough and if necessary severe, and it must be implemented by the home state itself. The local fleets must be fully satisfied with the monitoring, control and surveillance of foreign vessels.
Competition within the local fleet can only be kept within manageable levels if overall effort is controlled. This will mean sacrifices but it should be the goal of administrators and legislators to minimize these and have the burden shared as equally as possible. Ultimately there must be ceilings for all fishery effort and these need to be translated into ceilings on the power of individual units of effort. This will affect primarily engine power but may also involve the type and size of fishing gear that may be used.
The goal must surely be a system of permanence. One that will ensure conservation of fish resources for generations to come, security of work and income for the fishermen and the ancillary industry workers, and one that will provide the market and the consumer with a regular supply of quality food fish at reasonable cost.
7. DEVELOPING COUNTRY FISHERIES
7.1 Artisanal fishing fleets
Most developing country fisheries have very large artisanal sections and these constitute a social and economic problem not present to the same extent in industrialized countries. Countries with particularly large artisanal fishermen populations include India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Philippines, Korea, Nigeria and Brazil. Japan is perhaps the only industrialized country with an equivalent large number of small-scale fishermen, but their average incomes are high in comparison with most artisanal fishermen.
Most artisanal fishing fleets are characterized by extremely small units of effort utilizing mainly passive methods of fish capture such as gill nets, hand lines, traps, tangle nets, long lines, lift nets and cast nets. Catches per unit of effort are very low, often at marginal or subsistence level. Most of the fishing is conducted within 12 miles of land though some artisanal boats may travel many more miles from their home village.
The mechanization of artisanal fleets is limited and the vast majority of them still rely on sail and paddle for propulsion. Some experts now question the wisdom of mechanization programmes, believing that the best technological option for these craft to be a gentle combination of both sail and modest power. Of the estimated 900,000 artisanal fishing boats in the combined fleets of India, Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria, Korea and Brazil, some 100,000 or just over 10 percent were reckoned to be mechanized in 1979(FAO Fishery Country Profiles). Actual mechanization rates can vary from country to country, from under 5 percent to over 50 percent. Because of this, the artisanal fleets use on average only 60 litres of fuel to catch a tonne of fish compared with 300 litres consumed by commercial boats to produce the same amount.
7.2 Fishing pressure of artisanal fleets
Nearly 20 million tons of fish are caught annually by artisanal vessels. From an estimated 10 million fishermen and 2.5 million boats, that breaks down into an annual average catch of 2 tons per fishermen and 8 tons per boat. In a 200 day fishing year that would average out at 10 kg per fisherman and 40 kg per boat each fishing day.
Catch per unit is low because of the simple technology used and because of the sheer numbers of vessels concentrated in some localities. However, because the methods used are mostly passive and unsophisticated, pressure on the resource may not be too great. Catches per unit may decline if fleets increase in number but the stock itself may not be threatened if only artisanal boats are working it.
This is an extremely important fact both from the point of view of resource biology and of socio-economics. Sedentary species and marine mammals have been over-harvested, but to date there are no cases of a fish stock being destroyed by the actions of artisanal fishermen. All the drastic resource failures of the past 30 years have been due to the pressure of commercial or industrial fleets. The Peruvian anchovy, the South African pilchard, the North Sea herring, the Californian sardine and the whales all succumbed to such commercial efforts. The depressed state of demersal stocks in S.E. Asia has been brought about through over-capitalization in the trawl fisheries. In none of these cases did artisanal fleets, however large, play any more than a very minor role.
Problems arise when commercial fleets begin to operate in artisanal fishing grounds as has been happening in the Philippines and Indonesia. Then over-exploitation may well occur, but to blame it on the artisanal fishermen is a dishonesty and an injustice which adds insult to injury. Yet this view has been advocated at times in an effort to justify continued commercial operations on artisanal fishing grounds.
7.3 Enforcement of fisheries regulations
A major problem for any poor or under-developed country is the cost and technical demands of monitoring, control and surveillance. It is relatively easy to pass a law prohibiting fishing in a certain area, but if there is no fishery protection vessel to apprehend offenders, then the law becomes worthless. It is worse than no law because on paper at least there should be no cause for complaint. A similar situation exists if the powers of arrest and charging with offences lie with very junior local officials. A large and wealthy company can intimidate such persons with ease by one means or another.
There are some countries which have had fishery prohibitions on the statute books for many years and yet have not had a single successful prosecution against a commercial fishing company although hundreds of artisanal fishermen may have been tried and punished for similar but smaller violations.
A law is only as good as its enforcement. If the enforcement mechanism is lacking, the law has no teeth and is of no help to the fishery. Fishery management in developing countries may therefore be an impossible task until a competent protection service is established, large enough to police the waters and with sufficient authority and integrity to be able to do so without fear or favour.
Perhaps the Japanese system of management of coastal zones by local authorities with their own protection service may be a guide for such situations. Local fishermen's leaders and elected community representatives guide the management authority in its monitoring, control and surveillance activities. Alternatively, a strong Federal MCS unit as established in Malaysia might be able to effect enforcement without yielding to influential local business or political interests.
8. CONCLUSIONS & SUMMARY
For fisheries legislation and management measures to be really successful, the cooperation and agreement of fishermen is very necessary. The fishermen should be consulted and involved at all stages of the conception and formulation of regulations.
As most fishermen are to varying degrees members of rather inaccessible and inarticulate groups vis a vis government bureaucracies, special efforts in communication and liaison are necessary for proper consultation.
Fishery regulations should be adopted only after fishermen and administrators are satisfied that they would achieve the desired objectives, would be fair to all groups affected, would be enforceable at acceptable cost and would not have any serious side effects.
Control of fishing effort is scarcely possible without fixed limits to fleet size and fishing capacity. The most realistic measure of fishing capability is engine horse-power. Vessel length and tonnage are extremely poor guides. So a limit may have to be placed on the engine power of individual units. Some gear control may also be necessary.
Failure of management measures in developed countries can hardly be blamed on lack of enforcement facilities, data or research. Rather it has been due to poor work in the conception and formulation of regulations.
Developing or poor countries have different management priorities particularly as they mostly have large populations of artisanal fishermen with no alternative job prospects. As most LDCs are located in the tropics where many species of fish abound, they also have more complex stock management problems.
In both developed and developing fisheries, substantial protection should be afforded to the coastal belt for the benefit of small-scale fisheries and inshore
There is no need for large sea-going craft to fish inshore and a protective belt would not hurt the offshore fleet unduly. But it could mean salvation and preservation of viable inshore fishery with all its attendant benefits for small coastal communities.
The extent of the protective coastal belt will vary according to local requirements, but could be 6, 12 or 15 miles with some bays or firths completely enclosed
practically all fishermen want the resource conserved, not just for the immediate future but for future generations. Any resistance to conservation measures would be due to doubts about their effectiveness or their fairness, but not to the purport of the legislation itself.
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